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Re:	This is a response to a Call for Comments IEEE 802.16e-03/23 on IEEE 802.16e-03/07r4	
Abstract	This document contains suggestions on the additions in IEEE 802.16e-03/07r4 that would help user authorization in EAP-TLS procedure.	
Purpose	The document is submitted for review by Handoff/Sleep mode Ad Hoc Group and/or by 802.16 Working Group members	
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Changes in 802.16e Working Document for SS Authorization via EAP Framework

Ae Soon Park, Seokheon Cho, Sun Hwa Lim, Young Jin Kim, and Jee Hwan Ahn

I. Introduction

With the rapid growth of wireless technologies, interworking services between wireless networks have been increased recently. Especially, interworking between heterogeneous networks should be supported in the hot-spot network to authenticate mobile stations. Therefore, using the open API may be an efficient way to authenticate mobile stations. For example, 802.1x introduces the EAP framework as an open API.

When IEEE 802.16 networks interwork with other wireless networks (e.g. 802.11 a/b), it is difficult to accept the authentication framework that is provided in other wireless networks because IEEE 802.16 privacy sub-layer is a private protocol.

To authenticate mobile stations, if an authentication mechanism based on the open API is provided in IEEE 802.16 privacy sub-layer, IEEE 802.16 network is able to accept mobile stations of heterogeneous wireless network.

For authenticating an SS, IEEE 802.16 privacy sub-layer is based on X.509 certificate and uses Auth request and Auth reply of MAC messages.

We propose SS authentication mechanism based on EAP framework by adding IEEE 802.16 privacy sub-layer and define additional MAC messages for transferring EAP payload.

To transfer EAP payload on MAC layer, EAP Transfer Request (PKM-REQ) and EAP Transfer Reply (PKM-RSP) messages are newly defined. Additionally, attributes and each TLV of the messages are defined.

This Document describes changes suggested for 802.16d Working Document IEEE 802.16d-03/07r2 to authorize SS by EAP framework.

The following are the main issues:

- PKM messages added to on MAC message(EAP-transfer request and EAP-transfer reply definition)
- Attribute definition of EAP-transfer request message
- Attribute definition of EAP-transfer reply message
- TLV definition of each attribute

II. Changes in IEEE 802.16 Privacy

[in 6.2.2.3.9]

Table 25 – PKM Message Codes

Code	PKM Message Type	MAC Message Type
0 ~2	Reserved	
3	SA Add	PKM-RSP
4	Auth Request	PKM-REQ
5	Auth Reply	PKM-RSP
6	Auth Reject	PKM-RSP
7	Key Request	PKM-REQ
8	Key Reply	PKM-RSP
9	Key Reject	PKM-RSP
10	Auth Invalid	PKM-RSP
11	TEK Invalid	PKM-RSP
12	Auth Info	PKM-REQ
13	EAP-trans Request	PKM-REQ
14	EAP-trans Reply	PKM-RSP
15 ~ 255	reserved	

[In 6.2.2.3.9.2]

Replace

“6.2.2.3.9.2 Authorization Request (Auth Request) message”

To

“6.2.2.3.9.2 Authorization Request message”

[Add Under 6.2.2.3.9.2]

6.2.2.3.9.2.1 Auth Request message

Code: 4

Attributes are shown in Table 27.

....

An SAID attribute contains a Privacy SAID. In this case, the provided SAID is the SS's Basic CID, which is equal to the Basic CID assigned to the SS during initial ranging.

6.2.2.3.9.2.2 EAP Transfer Request message

Code : 13

Attributes are shown in Table 27-2.

Table 27-b EAP Transfer Request attributes

Attribute	Contents
Security-Capabilities	Describes requesting SS's security capabilities
SAID	Security Association ID, being equal to the Basic CID
SS's Public Key(Optional)	As a AK key generated by BS, otherwise omitted.
EAP Payload	Contains the EAP-TLS Data, not interpreted in the MAC

Security-Capabilities attribute is a compound attribute describing the requesting SS's security capabilities. This includes the data encryption and data authentication algorithms the SS supports.

An SAID attribute contains a Privacy SAID. In this case, the provided SAID is the SS's Basic CID, which is equal to the basic CID assigned to the SS during initial ranging.

EAP Payload attribute is not interpreted in this MAC layer, which contains a data payload for EAP-TLS or EAP-TTLS.

(Especially, Security-Capabilities and SAID field include only the 1'st EAP-transfer request.)

Replace

"6.2.2.3.9.3 Authorization Reply (Auth Reply) message"

To

"6.2.2.3.9.3 Authorization Reply message"

[Add Under 6.6.6.3.8.3]

6.2.2.3.9.3.1 Auth Reply message

Sent by the BS to a client SS in response to an Authorization Request, the Authorization Reply message contains an Authorization Key,

...

6.2.2.3.9.3.2 EAP Transfer Reply message

Sent by BS to a client SS in response to an EAP-transfer Request, the EAP-transfer Reply message contains an EAP Result Code(success or failure), Error Code, the key's life time, sequence number, and a list of SA-Descriptors identifying the Primary and Static SAs. The requesting SS is authorized to access and one's particular properties(e.g., type, cryptographic suite). The SA-Descriptor list shall include a descriptor for the Basic CID reported to the BS in the corresponding EAP-transfer Request. The SA-Descriptor list may include descriptors of Static SAIDs which are used for the SS authorization. The EAP Payload contains a data payload for EAP-TLS or EAP-TTLS.

Code :14

Attributes are shown in Table 28-2

Table 28-b EAP Transfer Reply attributes

Attribute	Contents
EAP Result Code	Describes success or failure
Error Code	Error code identifying reason for rejection or failure of authorization request. If EAP Result Code is success then its value
Key Sequence Number	Authorization key sequence number
Key Life Time	Authorization key life time
SA Descriptor	Specifies an SA ID and additional properties of the SA
EAP Payload	Contains the EAP-TLS Data, not interpreted in the MAC

[in 7]

Replace

“Privacy provides subscribers with privacy across the fixed broadband wireless network.”

To

“Privacy provides subscribers with privacy across the fixed **or mobile** broadband wireless network.”

[in 7.1]

Replace

- a) An encapsulation protocol for encryption packet data across the fixed broadband

wireless access network.

To

- b) a) An encapsulation protocol for encryption packet data across the fixed **or mobile** broadband wireless access network.

[In 7.1.2]

Replace

“7.1.2 key management protocol

An SS uses the PKM protocol or the EAP protocol to obtain authorization and traffic keying material from the BS, and to support periodic reauthorization and key refresh. The key management protocol for the PKM protocol uses X.509 digital certificates [IETF RFC 2459], the RSA public-key encryption algorithm [PKCS #1], and strong symmetric algorithms to perform key exchanges between SS and BS.”

...

The PKM protocol uses public-key cryptography to establish a shared secret (i.e., an Authorization Key) between SS and BS. The shared secret is then used to secure subsequent PKM exchanges of traffic encryption keys. This two-tiered mechanism for key distribution permits refreshing of traffic encryption keys without incurring the overhead of computation-intensive public-key operations.

A BS authenticates a client SS during the initial authorization exchange. Each SS carries a unique X.509 digital certificate issued by the SS’s manufacturer. The digital certificate contains the SS’s Public Key and SS MAC address. When requesting an Authorization Key, an SS presents its digital certificate to the BS. The BS verifies the digital certificate, and then uses the verified Public Key to encrypt an Authorization Key, which the BS then sends back to the requesting SS

.....

All SSs shall have factory-installed RSA private/public key pairs or provide an internal algorithm to generate such key pairs dynamically. If an SS relies on an internal algorithm to generate its RSA key pair, the SS shall generate the key pair prior to its first Authorization Key (AK) exchange, described in 7.2.1. All SSs with factory-installed RSA key pairs shall also have factory-installed X.509 certificates. All SSs that rely on internal algorithms to generate an RSA key pair shall support a mechanism for installing a manufacturer-issued X.509 certificate following key generation.

The PKM protocol is defined in detail in 7.2. ”

To

“7.1.2 key management protocol

An SS uses the PKM protocol or the EAP protocol to obtain authorization and traffic keying material from the BS, and to support periodic reauthorization and key refresh. The key management protocol for the PKM protocol uses X.509 digital certificates [IETF RFC 2459], the RSA public-key encryption algorithm [PKCS #1], and strong symmetric algorithms to perform key exchanges between SS and BS. **On the other hands, the key management protocol for the EAP protocol uses EAP-TLS or EAP-TTLS based on a EAP framework."**

....

The PKM protocol uses public-key cryptography to establish a shared secret (i.e., an Authorization Key) between SS and BS. The shared secret is then used to secure subsequent PKM exchanges of traffic encryption keys. This two-tiered mechanism for key distribution permits refreshing of traffic encryption keys without incurring the overhead of computation-intensive public-key operations.

In 802.16 Existing Policy mode, A BS authenticates a client SS during the initial authorization exchange. Each SS carries a unique X.509 digital certificate issued by the SS's manufacturer. The digital certificate contains the SS's Public Key and SS MAC address. When requesting an Authorization Key, an SS presents its digital certificate to the BS. The BS verifies the digital certificate, and then uses the verified Public Key to encrypt an Authorization Key, which the BS then sends back to the requesting SS

...

All SSs shall have factory-installed RSA private/public key pairs or provide an internal algorithm to generate such key pairs dynamically. If an SS relies on an internal algorithm to generate its RSA key pair, the SS shall generate the key pair prior to its first Authorization Key (AK) exchange, described in 7.2.1. All SSs with factory-installed RSA key pairs shall also have factory-installed X.509 certificates. All SSs that rely on internal algorithms to generate an RSA key pair shall support a mechanism for installing a manufacturer-issued X.509 certificate following key generation.

.In Open Policy mode, an AAA server authenticates a client SS during the initial authorization exchange process using EAP data. Each SS carries a EAP payload. The EAP payload contains the EAP-TLS or EAP-TTLS Data. MAC data contains EAP payload with a MAC header. MAC header consists of general MAC Header and PKM header. A PKM header contains optionally the SS's Public key attribute. The Public key can be used to encrypt an AK key which is generated by BS, otherwise this attribute will be omitted.

The PKM protocol is defined in detail in 7.2"

[Add Under 7.2.1]

7.2.1.1 Existing Authorization Policy Mode

7.2.1.2 Open Authorization Policy Mode

An SS begins authorization by sending an 1st EAP transfer Request message to its BS. The 1st EAP transfer Request message contains the Security-Capabilities, SAID, and EAP Payload.

The SS sends an EAP Transfer Request message to its BS immediately after sending the 1st EAP Transfer Request message. This is a request for an AK, as well as for the SAIDs identifying any Static Security SAs the SS is authorized to participate in. The EAP transfer Request includes

- a) EAP payload
- b) a description of the cryptographic algorithms the requesting SS supports; an SS's cryptographic capabilities are presented to the BS as a list of cryptographic suite identifiers. Each one indicates a particular pair of packet data encryption and packet data authentication algorithms the SS supports
- c) the SS's Basic CID. The Basic CID is the first static CID the BS assigns to an SS during initial ranging – the primary SAID is equal to the Basic CID

In response to an EAP Transfer Request message, a BS through AAA server validates the requesting SS's identity, determines the encryption algorithm and protocol shared with the SS, activates an AK for the SS, optionally encrypts it with the SS's public key, and sends it back to the SS in an EAP Transfer Reply message. Otherwise an AK key shares between SS and BS by Upper Layer Security Protocol based on EAP framework such as EAP-TLS or EAP-TTLS. The EAP Transfer Reply includes:

- a) EAP Result code
- b) Error Code, if EAP Result Code is failure
- c) an AK encrypted with the SS's public key, according to key distribution mechanism
- d) a 4-bit key sequence number, used to distinguish between successive generations of AKs
- e) a key lifetime
- f) the identities (i.e., the SAIDs) and properties of the single primary and zero or more static SAs the SS is authorized to obtain keying information for
- g) EAP Payload

While the EAP Transfer Reply shall identify Static SAs in addition to the Primary SA whose SAID matches with the requesting SS's Basic CID, the EAP Transfer Reply shall not identify any Dynamic SAs.

The BS, in responding to an SS's EAP Transfer Request, shall determine whether the requesting SS, whose identity can be verified via the EAP framework, is authorized for basic unicast services, and what additional statically provisioned services (i.e., Static SAIDs) the SS's user has subscribed for.

An SS shall periodically refresh its AK by reissuing an EAP Transfer Request to the BS. Reauthorization is identical to authorization with the exception that the SS does not send any other messages during reauthorization.

[In 7.2.3]

Replace

"As part of their authorization exchange, the SS provides the BS with a list of all the cryptographic suites (pairing of data encryption and data authentication algorithms) the SS supports. The BS selects from this list a single cryptographic suite to employ with the requesting SS's primary SA. The Authorization Reply or the BS sends back to the SS includes a primary SA descriptor which, among other things, identifies the cryptographic suite the BS selected to use for the SS's primary SA. A BS shall reject the authorization request if it determines that none of the offered cryptographic suites are satisfactory.

The Authorization Reply also contains an optional list of static SA descriptors; each static SA descriptor identifies the cryptographic suite employed within the SA. The selection of a static SA's cryptographic suite is typically made independent of the requesting SS's cryptographic capabilities. A BS may include in its Authorization Reply static SA descriptors identifying cryptographic suites the requesting SS does not support; if this is the case, the SS shall not start TEK state machines for static SAs whose cryptographic suites the SS does not support."

To

"As part of their authorization exchange, the SS provides the BS with a list of all the cryptographic suites (pairing of data encryption and data authentication algorithms) the SS supports. The BS selects from this list a single cryptographic suite to employ with the requesting SS's primary SA. The Authorization Reply or **EAP Transfer Reply**, the BS sends back to the SS includes a primary SA descriptor which, among other things, identifies the cryptographic suite the BS selected to use for the SS's primary SA. A BS shall reject the

authorization request or **EAP Transfer Request** if it determines that none of the offered cryptographic suites are satisfactory.

The Authorization Reply or **EAP Transfer Reply** also contains an optional list of static SA descriptors; each static SA descriptor identifies the cryptographic suite employed within the SA. The selection of a static SA's cryptographic suite is typically made independent of the requesting SS's cryptographic capabilities. A BS may include in its Authorization **Reply or EAP Transfer Reply** static SA descriptors identifying cryptographic suites the requesting SS does not support; if this is the case, the SS shall not start TEK state machines for static SAs whose cryptographic suites the SS does not support."

[In 7.2.4]

Replace

"d) State transitions (i.e., the lines between states) are labeled with <what causes the transition>/<messages and events triggered by the transition>. So "*timeout/Auth Request*" means that the state received a "timeout" event and sent an Authorization Request ("Auth Request") message. If there are multiple events or messages before the slash "/" separated by a comma, *any* of them can cause the transition. If there are multiple events or messages listed after the slash, *all* of the specified actions shall accompany the transition."

To

"d) State transitions (i.e., the lines between states) are labeled with <what causes the transition>/<messages and events triggered by the transition>. So "*timeout/Auth Request or EAP-trans Request*" means that the state received a "timeout" event and sent an Authorization Request **or EAP Transfer Request** ("Auth Request", "**EAP-trans Request**") message. If there are multiple events or messages before the slash "/" separated by a comma, *any* of them can cause the transition. If there are multiple events or messages listed after the slash, *all* of the specified actions shall accompany the transition."

[Add Under Figure 97]




Figure 97-b Authorization state machine flow diagram (open policy)

[In Table 72]

State Event or Rcvd Message	(A) Start	(B) Auth Wait	(C) Authorized	(D) Reauth Wait	(E) Auth Reject Wait	(F) Silent
(1) Communication Established	Auth Wait					
(2) Auth Reject or EAP-Trans Reply (R)		Auth Reject Wait		Auth Reject Wait		
(3) Perm Auth Reject		Silent		Silent		
(4) Auth Reply or EAP-Trans Reply (S)		Authorized		Authorized		
(5) Timeout		Auth Wait		Reauth Wait	Start	
(6) Auth Grace Timeout			Reauth Wait			
(7) Auth Invalid			Reauth Wait	Reauth Wait		
(8) Reauth			Reauth Wait			

[In 7.2.4.1]**Replace**

“b) *Authorize Wait (Auth Wait)*: The SS has received the “Communication Established” event indicating that it has completed basic capabilities negotiation with the BS. In response to receiving the event, the SS has sent both an Authentication Information and an Auth Request message to the BS and is waiting for the reply.

c) *Authorized*: The SS has received an Auth Reply or message which contains a list of valid SAIDs for this SS. At this point, the SS has a valid AK and SAID list. Transition into this state triggers the creation of one TEK FSM for each of the SS’s privacy-enabled SAIDs.

d) *Reauthorize Wait (Reauth Wait)*: The SS has an outstanding reauthorization request. The SS was either about to expire (see Authorization Grace Time in Table 119) its current authorization or received an indication (an Authorization Invalid message from the BS) that its authorization is no longer valid. The SS sent an Auth Request message to the BS and is waiting for a response.

e) *Authorize Reject Wait (Auth Reject Wait)*: The SS received an Authorization Reject (Auth Reject) message in response to its last Auth Request. The Auth Reject’s error code indicated the error was not of a permanent nature. In response to receiving this reject message, the SS set a timer and transitioned to the Auth Reject Wait state. The SS remains in this state until the timer expires. In response ..

f) *Silent*: The SS received an Auth Reject message in response to its last Auth Request. The Auth Reject’s error code indicated the error was of a permanent nature. This triggers a transition to the Silent state, where the SS is not permitted to pass subscriber traffic. The SS shall, however, respond to management messages from the BS issuing the Perm Auth Reject.”

To

“ b) *Authorize Wait (Auth Wait)*: The SS has received the “Communication Established” event indicating that it has completed basic capabilities negotiation with the BS. In response to receiving the event, the SS has sent both an Authentication Information and an Auth Request message or **EAP-trans Request** to the BS and is waiting for the reply.

c) *Authorized*: The SS has received an Auth Reply or **last EAP-trans Reply** message which contains a list of valid SAIDs for this SS. At this point, the SS has a valid AK and SAID list. Transition into this state triggers the creation of one TEK FSM for each of the SS’s privacy-enabled SAIDs.

d) *Reauthorize Wait (Reauth Wait)*: The SS has an outstanding reauthorization request. The SS was either about to expire (see Authorization Grace Time in Table 119) its current authorization or received an indication (an Authorization Invalid message from the BS or **an EAP-trans Reply**

(R) from the BS) that its authorization is no longer valid. The SS sent an Auth Request or EAP-trans Request message to the BS and is waiting for a response.

e) *Authorize Reject Wait (Auth Reject Wait)*: The SS received an Authorization Reject (Auth Reject) or EAP-trans Reply (R) message in response to its last Auth Request or EAP-trans Request. The Auth Reject's or EAP-trans Reply's error code indicated the error was not of a permanent nature. In response to receiving this reject message, the SS set a timer and transitioned to the Auth Reject Wait state. The SS remains in this state until the timer expires. In response ..

f) *Silent*: The SS received an Auth Reject or EAP-trans Reply (R) message in response to its last Auth Request or EAP-trans Request. The Auth Reject's or EAP-trans Reply's(R) error code indicated the error was of a permanent nature. This triggers a transition to the Silent state, where the SS is not permitted to pass subscriber traffic. The SS shall, however, respond to management messages from the BS issuing the Perm Auth Reject."

[In 7.2.4.2]

Replace

"Note that the message formats are defined in detail in 6.2.2.3.9.

Authorization Request (Auth Request): Request an AK and list of authorized SAIDs. Sent from SS to BS.

Authorization Reply (Auth Reply): Receive an AK and list of authorized, static SAIDs. Sent from BS to SS. The Authorization Key is encrypted with the SS's public key

Authorization Reject (Auth Reject): Attempt to authorize was rejected. Sent from the BS to the SS.

Authorization Invalid (Auth Invalid): The BS may send an Authorization Invalid message to a client SS as

follows:

a) an unsolicited indication, or"

To

Note that the message formats are defined in detail in 6.2.2.3.9.

Authorization Request (Auth Request or EAP-trans Request): Request an AK and list of authorized SAIDs. Sent from SS to BS.

Authorization Reply (Auth Reply or EAP-trans Reply): Receive an AK and list of authorized, static SAIDs. Sent from BS to SS. The Authorization Key is encrypted with the SS's public key or encrypted with the upper layer security protocol based on EAP framework(e.g., EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS).

Authorization Reject (Auth Reject or EAP-trans Reply(R)): Attempt to authorize was rejected. Sent from the BS to the SS.

Authorization Invalid (Auth Invalid or EAP-trans Reply(R)): The BS may send an Authorization Invalid message to a client SS as follows:

a) an unsolicited indication, or"

[In 7.2.4.5]

Replace

"Actions taken in association with state transitions are listed by <event> (<rcvd message>) --> <state> below:

1-A Start (*Communication Established*) → Auth Wait

- (a) send Authent Info message to BS
- (b) send Auth Request message to BS
- (c) set Auth Request retry timer to Auth Wait Timeout

2-B Auth Wait (*Auth Reject*) → Auth Reject Wait

- b) set a wait timer to Auth Reject Wait Timeout

2-D Reauth Wait (*Auth Reject*) → Auth Reject Wait

- c) set a wait timer to Auth RejectWait Timeout

4-B Auth Wait (*Auth Reply*) → Authorized

- b) decrypt and record AK delivered with Auth Reply

4-D Reauth Wait (*Auth Reply*) → Authorized

- b) decrypt and record AK delivered with Auth Reply
- c) start TEK FSMs for any newly authorized SAIDs listed in Auth Reply (provided the SS supports the cryptographic suite that is associated with the new SAID) and issue TEK FSM Authorized event for each of the new TEK FSMs

5-B Auth Wait (*Timeout*) → Auth Wait

- a) send Authent Info message to BS
- b) send Auth Request message to BS
- c) set Auth Request retry timer to Auth Wait Timeout

5-D Reauth Wait (*Timeout*) → Reauth Wait

- a) send Auth Request message to BS

6-C Authorized (*Auth Grace Timeout*) → Reauth Wait

- a) send Auth Request message to BS
- 7-C Authorized (*Auth Invalid*) → Reauth Wait
- b) send Auth Request message to BS

- 8-C Authorized (*Reauth*) → Reauth Wait
- b) send Auth Request message to BS

To

“Actions taken in association with state transitions are listed by <event> (<rcvd message>) --> <state> below:

- 1-A Start (*Communication Established*) → Auth Wait
 - (a) send Auth Info message to BS, and send Auth Request message to BS
 - (b) or send EAP Transfer Request message to BS
 - (c) set Auth Request retry timer to Auth Wait Timeout
- 2-B Auth Wait (*Auth Reject, EAP-trans Reply*) → Auth Reject or EAP-trans Reply(R) Wait
 - b) set a wait timer to Auth Reject or EAP Transfer Reply(R) Wait Timeout
- 2-D Reauth Wait (*Auth Reject, EAP-trans Reply*) → Auth Reject Wait
 - c) set a wait timer to Auth Reject or EAP Transfer Reply(R) Wait Timeout
- 4-B Auth Wait (*Auth Reply or EAP-trans Reply*) → Authorized
 - b) decrypt and record AK delivered with Auth Reply or delivered with EAP-trans Reply
- 4-D Reauth Wait (*Auth Reply or EAP-trans Reply*) → Authorized
 - b) decrypt and record AK delivered with Auth Reply or delivered with EAP-trans Reply
 - c) start TEK FSMs for any newly authorized SAIDs listed in Auth Reply or EAP-trans Reply (provided the SS supports the cryptographic suite that is associated with the new SAID) and issue TEK FSM Authorized event for each of the new TEK FSMs
- 5-B Auth Wait (*Timeout*) → Auth Wait
 - (a) send Auth Info message to BS, and send Auth Request message to BS
 - (b) or send EAP Transfer Request message to BS
 - (c) set Auth Request retry timer to Auth Wait Timeout
- 5-D Reauth Wait (*Timeout*) → Reauth Wait
 - a) send Auth Request or EAP-trans Request message to BS
- 6-C Authorized (*Auth Grace Timeout*) → Reauth Wait
 - a) send Auth Request or EAP-trans Request message to BS

7-C Authorized (*Auth Invalid*) → Reauth Wait

b) send Auth Request or EAP-trans Request message to BS

8-C Authorized (*Reauth*) → Reauth Wait

b) send Auth Request or EAP-trans Request message to BS

[in 7.4.1.2]

Figure 99 Modified




Figure 99—AK management in BS and SS

[In 7.5.5]**Replace**

“ 7.5.5 Public-key Encryption of AK Key

AKs in Auth Reply, MGF1 with SHA-1 for the mask-generation function, and the empty”

To

“ 7.5.5 Encryption of authorization key

7.5.5.1 Existing Authorization Policy Mode

AKs in Auth Reply, MGF1 with SHA-1 for the mask-generation function, and the empty string for the encoding parameter string.

7.5.5.2 Open Policy Mode

AK keys in EAP-trans Reply messages shall be encrypted by EAP framework protocol using the upper layer security protocol (e.g., EAP-TLS, or EAP-TTLS), or shall be a RSA public-key encrypted using the SS's public key, according to key generation mechanism. The AK Key can generated by AAA server or BS. In the 1'st case, the AK key encrypted by EAP framework, and in the 2'nd case, the AK key encryption mechanism has the same mechanism with the existing policy mode.”

[Under 11.2.19.7]**[11.2.20] EAP Payload**

Description : The EAP Payload attribute is not interpreted in this MAC layer, which contains a data payload for EAP-TLS or EAP-TTLS. This attribute uses only an EAP Transfer Request and an EAP Transfer Reply.

Type	Length	Value (string)
28	n	EAP payload data

[in 11.2.21] EAP Result Code

Description : The EAP Result Code attribute indicates the error status, is included in an EAP-transfer Reply.

Type	Length	Value (string)
129	1	0 : Success 1 : Failure

